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We look at the moral or spiritual side of a treaty. . . . Treaties
mean words that nobody can get around, get over, get under.
-Richard Real Bird, Chairman, Crow Tribe1
It is long settled that "the provisions of an act of Congress, passed in
the exercise of its constitutional authority, . . . if clear and explicit,
must be upheld by the courts, even in contravention of express stipu-
lations in an earlier treaty" . . . . This Court [has] applied that rule
to congressional abrogation of Indian treaties ....
-United States v. Dion2
The treaties between the United States and the Indians3 constitute a
1. Remarks at the Philadelphia Ethical Society Symposium on American Indian Tribes and the
United States Constitution (Oct. 12, 1987); see also V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDI-
ANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 43 (1983) ("When the Indian nations treated with the United States gov-
ernment, they undoubtedly assumed that the negotiated agreements would endure 'ad infinitum.' ");
Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or
Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 612 n.53
(1975) ("Indians continue to expect treaty promises to be honored. On the reservation, treaties are
spoken of with a reverence that is equalled only by discussions of tribal sovereignty.").
2. 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720
(1893)).
3. The Court concluded long ago that the Constitution recognizes the ability of the United States
and the Indian nations to enter into treaties. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-60
(1832).
Between 1789 and 1871, Indian treaties were negotiated and signed by the executive and consented
to by the Senate. See 2 C. BUTLER, THE TREATY MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES § 404,
at 198-99 (1902). In 1871, Congress passed a bill stating in part that no additional treaties were to be
made with the Indians. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
71 (1982)). This provision may have been a compromise resulting from the House's anger at being
expected to appropriate money to implement the treaties even though it did not participate in their
negotiation. See D. GrcHEs & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 110
(2d ed. 1986). Others suggest that it resulted from a belief that Indian sovereignty was no longer a
viable notion. See Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: Inher-
ent Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 600, 606-07 (1976). The provision is
usually seen as a notice by the House that it will refuse to appropriate money to implement Indian
treaties. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1975).
From 1871 until the end of the era of negotiated settlements with the Indians in 1909, agreements
were negotiated and signed by the executive and consented to by simple majorities of both houses of
Congress. See Note, Federal Indian Policy: A Violation of International Treaty Law, 4 W. ST. U.L.
REV. 229, 237 n.38 (1977). These agreements have the full force of treaties. See Antoine v. Washing-
ton, 420 U.S. 194, 204 (1975); Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 359 (1908). Altogether, approxi-
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critical recognition and guarantee of Indian rights.4 They envision a
"measured separatism"' for an important minority6 that is determined to
maintain a distinct cultural and political identity.' Non-treaty rights are
fragile: The Supreme Court has held that Indians are not citizens within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and that Congress has "ple-
nary power" over Indian affairs by virtue of its guardianship over their
interests.9 Moreover, the United States has ended the formal negotiation
process with the Indians, and apparently no further treaties will be con-
cluded.10 Thus, Congress' power to abrogate 1 the Indian treaties limits
the Indians' ability to maintain their unique communities.
Notwithstanding the importance of the treaties, the Supreme Court has
mately 400 treaties and agreements were concluded. See C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME,
AND THE LAW 8 (1987).
4. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (treaty "[is] not a grant of rights to the
Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted").
5. See C. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 14-19 (arguing that treaties guarantee substantial Indian
independence as well as federal protection and provision of services); see also Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832) (discussing notion of separatism).
Indian treaties cover a wide range of subjects, including trade, extradition, war and peace, political
sovereignty, territorial boundaries, hunting and fishing rights, relations with other countries, and gen-
eral assistance benefits. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 38-46
(1942); Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 602-12; Note, supra note 3, at 237-38. Rights such
as land occupancy are necessary for maintaining Indian culture and cannot be truly compensated for
with money. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 604-07. Rights such as sovereignty are
difficult to protect in a traditional constitutional framework. See Washington v. Confederated Bands
and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nations, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979) (rejecting due process challenge
to congressional restriction of tribal sovereignty); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23
(1978) (tribes have no absolute constitutional right to autonomy). But see R. BARSH & J. HENDER-
SON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 261-62, 264-67 (1980) (arguing that
tribal sovereignty should be protected as retained right under Ninth and Tenth Amendments);
Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195,
261 (1984) (suggesting that apportionment and Indian commerce clauses recognize some rights of self-
government). Many treaties recognize and promise to protect tribal sovereignty. See id. at 262 &
n.385.
6. The 1980 census reported approximately 1.5 million Indians living in the United States. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION ch. C, pt. 1,
at 1-12 (1983). Roughly one-half live on-reservation. See D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, supra note
3, at 7. Despite their relatively small numbers, Indian tribes and individuals control substantial land,
energy, and mineral resources. See id. at 13, 614.
7. See V. DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE 250 (1974); V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 1, at xi-xiii; see also D.
GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 18-20 (quoting various authorities).
8. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102, 109 (1884). Some Indians were made citizens by treaties
and statutes. See generally D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 548-49. General citizen-
ship was granted by the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1401(b) (1982)).
9. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 383 (1885). The guardian or "trust" relation can be traced to language contained in several early
opinions. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (using analogy of "tributary" or
"feudatory" state); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Marshall, C.J.) (stat-
ing that Indian nations are not foreign nations but "domestic dependent nations" and that "[t]heir
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian"). For a detailed history of the
guardian relation, see Newton, supra note 5.
10. See supra note 3.
11. In this Note, "abrogation" is used as a general term to refer to the elimination of treaty
obligations by any means. See A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 491 (1961).
Indian Treaties
repeatedly recognized the power of Congress to abrogate them unilaterally
when Congress has clearly expressed its intent to do so.12 However, the
Court has never clearly described the basis for this power. In 1871, the
Court suggested in The Cherokee Tobacco 3 that congressional abrogation
is an application of the last-in-time rule, under which a treaty may super-
sede a prior statute and a statute may supersede a prior treaty.14 Thirty-
two years later, the Court offered two other justifications in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock. 5 Lone Wolf hints that abrogation can be justified by Congress'
plenary power over Indian affairs." In addition, the decision suggests that
abrogation can be viewed as an application of the international law doc-
trine of rebus sic stantibus, under which one party may terminate a treaty
due to a fundamental change in circumstances.'7
This Note argues that none of these three justifications is persuasive
and that the Court should give increased protection to Indian treaties. Sec-
tion I provides the relevant background on treaties. Section II examines
the justifications and concludes that none of them is persuasive. Finally,
Section III proposes that congressional abrogation be limited by a "last-
in-time plus" rule that would require Congress to provide both an express
statement of abrogation and an acceptable reason as measured by the re-
quirements for treaty termination under international law. This standard
acknowledges the extensive congressional power over Indian affairs, while
also recognizing the importance of the treaties and the unique status and
history of the Indian peoples."
I. BACKGROUND ON TREATIES
A treaty may be thought of as a contract between two or more states.' 9
Under the Constitution, treaties are made by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.2" The Court also has upheld "agreements"
made by the President with the consent of both houses of Congress. These
12. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
13. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871).
14. Id. at 621.
15. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
16. Id. at 565-66.
17. Id. at 566.
18. Commentators suggest a variety of ways to protect Indian treaty rights. Some argue for in-
creased protection under the Constitution. See supra note 5. Some would rely on an expanded notion
of the guardian relation. See Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1227 (1975). Others would require an express statement of con-
gressional intent in statutes that abrogate Indian treaty rights. See, e.g., Wilkinson & Volkman, supra
note 1, at 645. Still others assert that any abrogation of treaty rights is a per se violation of interna-
tional law. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 268.
19. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 877 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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agreements have the full force of treaties2' and differ only in that both
houses of Congress consent.22
The international law doctrine of pacta sunt servanda requires that
parties to a treaty perform their obligations in good faith."3 Nevertheless,
international law provides that treaties can be terminated for the follow-
ing reasons: termination under the terms of the treaty or by consent of the
parties; implied termination by a subsequent treaty; denunciation or with-
drawal from certain types of treaties, such as treaties of alliance and com-
merce; termination as a consequence of a breach by another party; termi-
nation due to a fundamental change in circumstances; and, in certain
situations, termination due to war between the parties.2" Unilateral termi-
nation requires that formal notice be given by the terminating party.25 In
the United States, the power to terminate treaties has been claimed for
Congress, the President, and the President-and-Senate, and the location of
the power has been, and continues to be, hotly contested.26
Treaties (or their provisions) are either "self-executing" or "non-self-
executing."'2 7 The Court has interpreted the supremacy clause2" to mean
that self-executing treaties automatically become the supreme law of the
land without the need of any legislative action.2 Thus, they are superior
21. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 204 (1975); Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340,
359 (1908). The Court also has recognized executive agreements made by the President alone. See
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31
(1937). Executive agreements are beyond the scope of this Note.
22. In this Note, the terms "treaty" and "agreement" are used interchangeably.
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
321 & comment a (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; A. MCNAIR, supra note 11, at
493-505; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 881 n.1; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 148-49 (5th ed. 1967). See generally Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 775 (1959).
24. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, §§ 331-336; International Law Com-
mission Report, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1; 5 G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297-390 (1943); A. MCNAIR, supra note 11, at
493-589; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 936-49.
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 337; Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 65 & art. 67, para. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 938-42. The United States is not a party to
the Convention, but the President, in submitting the Convention to the Senate, stated that the Conven-
tion "is already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." S.
ExEc. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
26. See generally SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., TERMINA-
TION OF TREATIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF POWER (Comm. Print 1978); D. AD-
LER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES (1986); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 167-71 (1972).
27. Whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpreting the agreement in light of its
subject matter, the nature of its obligations, and the circumstances surrounding its adoption. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 111 comments h, i & reporters' notes 5, 6; L. HENKIN, supra
note 26, at 158-59. For general discussions of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, see id. at
156-61; L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. Smrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 198-205 (2d ed. 1987).
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
29. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Chew Heong v. United
States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
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to state laws and constitutions"0 and on a par with federal statutes.31 In
the case of non-self-executing treaties, it is the implementing legislation
that is the supreme law of the land. 2 Thus, both self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties may have domestic consequences.
There are three ways for Congress to repeal the domestic effect of a
treaty. First, Congress may be able to terminate the treaty.33 Second, Con-
gress can repeal the legislation implementing a non-self-executing treaty."
Finally, the Court has developed a last-in-time rule for self-executing
treaties, under which a treaty may supersede a prior statute and a statute
may supersede a prior treaty.35 In the latter two cases, the international
obligations contained in the treaty remain; although domestic courts will
give effect to the repeal, the United States remains obligated under inter-
national law.3 6 The last-in-time rule is subject to a "clear statement"
principle that requires a clear intent to supersede.
3 7
Indian and international treaties are the same in many important re-
spects. Indian treaties are contracts between two sovereign states,38 are the
supreme law of the land,39 and may be abrogated by unilateral congres-
sional action.40 The status of the Indian nations, however, is the subject of
30. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880).
31. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598
(1884); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 111 comment h; L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at
157 n.t.
33. See supra text accompanying note 26.
34. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). Congress may be able to avoid entirely
the domestic effect of a non-self-executing treaty by refusing to pass the implementing legislation. See
L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 161-62. If Congress fails to pass the implementing legislation, how-
ever, the United States remains obligated under international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 23, § 111 comment h; Preuss, On Amending the Treaty-Making Power: A Comparative
Study of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1117, 1139-41 (1953).
35. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). For detailed discussions of the
historical development of this rule in the United States, see L. ERADES & W. GOULD, THE RELA-
TION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS AND IN THE
UNITED STATES 372-88, 419-56 (1961); Spear, The Conflict of Treaties and Laws, 22 ALB. L.J.
226 (1880). Other countries take a variety of approaches. See generally L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER & H. SMrT, supra note 27, at 207 (discussing status of last-in-time rule in France, Italy,
Germany, and the Netherlands).
36. See Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co. v. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 115 comment b; 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 24, at
185-86, 194-95, 324-25.
37. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 720 (1893).
38. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 675 (1979).
39. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 204 (1975); United States v. Forty-thrce
Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-60
(1832).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986). The loss of Indian rights due to
abrogation is ameliorated to some degree by the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which has been
construed to require that compensation be given for certain abrogations. See, e.g., United States v.
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 401-23 (1980); Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States,
299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937). This Note focuses on the abrogation of self-executing portions of Indian
treaties. The refusal to implement non-self-executing provisions and the supersession of implementing
legislation are beyond the scope of this Note.
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much debate. Some commentators claim that many Indian nations qualify
as "states" under international law.
4  The Court has not gone this far4
2
and recently described Indian sovereignty to be of a "unique and limited
character."'43 Consequently, the Court treats Indian and international
treaties differently in two major respects, both of which extend more pro-
tection to Indian treaties.
First, the Court has been less willing to infer abrogations of Indian
treaties than of international treaties." However, it has had some trouble
deciding what form a clear statement principle should take in the Indian
context. At various times, the Court has adopted the following tests: abro-
gation requires a showing of clear legislative intent; abrogation will not be
lightly imputed; abrogation will be found only after construing the statute
in favor of the treaty; and abrogation is subject to an "express statement"
principle that requires an explicit legislative reference to treaty rights.4
In its most recent statement, the Court required "clear evidence that Con-
gress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the
one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that
conflict by abrogating the treaty.
' 46
Second, the Court applies traditional contract principles in interpreting
international treaties,47 but it has developed special canons of construction
for Indian treaties: ambiguous expressions are resolved in favor of the In-
dians;48 treaties are interpreted as the Indians themselves would have un-
derstood them; 49 and treaties are liberally construed in favor of the
Indians.
50
41. See, e.g., Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native
Americans Under International Law, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 669 (1978); Note, supra note 3.
42. The Court early on rejected the notion that Indian nations possessed the full sovereignty of
foreign nations. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (using analogy to "tribu-
tary" or "feudatory" states); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (Indian nations
are not foreign nations within meaning of Article III); Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (Indians' "rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,
[are] necessarily diminished"). However, the Court has held that tribal sovereignty predates the Con-
stitution and that the Indian nations possess, in addition to the federal government and the states, a
third source of sovereignty in the United States. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319-32
(1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). For a brief introduction to the complicated
history of Indian sovereignty, see C. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 54-63.
43. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). The Court also stated that Indian sover-
eignty is subject to "complete defeasance" by Congress. Id.
44. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 622.
45. See generally id. at 623-45.
46. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986).
47. See, e.g., Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331-32 (1912); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S.
424, 437 (1902).
48. See, e.g., MeClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
49. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970).
50. See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
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II. CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF INDIAN TREATIES:
REEVALUATION
A. The Cherokee Tobacco: The Last-in-Time Rule
The Cherokee Tobacco5 involved the conflict between a treaty provision
guaranteeing to Cherokees living within their nation the right to manufac-
ture and sell tobacco products without "paying any tax thereon,"52 and a
subsequent statute imposing taxes on tobacco "produced anywhere within
the exterior boundaries of the United States." 3 The Court noted that
such conflicts arise because the Constitution declares self-executing trea-
ties to be the supreme law of the land."' It acknowledged that the conflict
is "not settled by the Constitution,"55 but asserted that there was "not
. ..any doubt as to its proper solution.""8 In what was its first general
pronouncement on the relation between treaties and statutes, the Court
held that such conflicts would be decided by the last-in-time rule, under
which, as a matter of domestic law, "[a] treaty may supersede a prior act
of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty."' 57 In
51. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871).
52. Treaty of July 19, 1866, art. X, 14 Stat. 799, 801.
53. Internal Revenue Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 107, 15 Stat. 125, 167.
54. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 620.
55. Id. at 621.
56. Id.
57. Id. The Court relied on Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), for the proposition
that a treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and on two circuit court opinions, Taylor v.
Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), affd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862), and
In re Clinton Bridge, 5 F. Cas. 1060 (C.C.D. Iowa 1867) (No. 2900), affd, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454
(1870), for the proposition that an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.
Foster involved a suit to recover certain lands claimed under a Spanish grant that was assertedly
ratified by treaty. The Court rejected this argument, finding the treaty to be non-self-executing. 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) at 315. The Court went on to state, without explanation or support, that statutes and
self-executing treaties are equivalent, and that had the treaty been self-executing it would have super-
seded any prior inconsistent statutes. Id.
Taylor involved the conflict between a commercial treaty and a subsequent tariff act. Justice Curtis,
sitting as Circuit Justice, found the treaty to be non-self-executing and held that Congress was free to
repeal its implementing legislation. 23 F. Cas. at 787-88. He went on to offer a lengthy discussion of
treaty-statute conflicts. The Constitution, he noted, does not resolve the conflict. Id. at 785. The
starting point is to examine the "nature and objects of each species of law" and the "authority from
which each emanated." Id. He went on to state, without explanation or support, that the issue is
"solely a matter of [domestic] law." Id. He argued that if the only way to undo the domestic effect of
a treaty was to obtain the consent of the other party, the country would be placed in the absurd
position of being dependent on a foreign government for its domestic law. Id. at 786. Thus, there must
be the domestic power to repeal the domestic effect of a treaty. That Congress possesses it follows
from the power to issue a declaration of war, which would automatically repeal certain provisions of
treaties with the hostile party, and the power to regulate commerce, the subject matter of the treaty in
question. Id. Curtis cited no authority for his position.
Clinton Bridge involved the conflict between a statute declaring the bridge to be a lawful structure
and prior treaties providing for the free and unobstructed navigation of the Mississippi. In resolving
the issue in favor of the statute, Justice Miller, sitting as Circuit Justice, relied mainly on separation
of powers concerns. He argued that such conflicts involved political questions. 5 F. Cas. at 1062.
Moreover, if the judicial department could give effect to treaties in the face of subsequent statutes, "it
could annul declarations of war, suspend the levy of armies, and become a great international arbi-
ter." Id. As support for his position, Miller cited The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821).
This latter case did not discuss the issue at all, although it had been raised during arguments, and one
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this regard, the Court saw no difference between Indian treaties and in-
ternational treaties,58 but it noted that there were special "considerations
of humanity and good faith" involved in the observance of Indian trea-
ties.59 The Court nonetheless declared that such conflicts were political
questions and suggested that the proper redress was an appeal to
Congress."0
B. General Discussion of the Last-in-Time Rule
This section focuses on the general arguments surrounding the last-in-
time rule. The next section considers these arguments in the context of
Indian treaties. The general arguments can be grouped into three catego-
ries: international law arguments, constitutional law arguments, and argu-
ments arising from prudential concerns about treaties."1
The relevant international law arguments concern the relation of inter-
national law to domestic law, the character of sovereignty, and the nature
of treaties. There are two main approaches to the relation of international
law to domestic law. 2 One argues that the two systems are completely
separate and that international law can be applied domestically only when
it has been incorporated by the domestic organs of government.6 3 Once
incorporated, international law is subject to the limitations applicable to
all domestic law and may be repealed for domestic purposes by subse-
quent domestic action.64 The second approach considers the two systems
to be part of a single legal order in which domestic law derives its author-
ity from international law and stands in a lower position in the hierarchy
of legal systems.65 The United States appears to have adopted the first
counsel had offered his opinion that a later statute must prevail. Id. at 65.
58. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 621.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Because this Note focuses on abrogation of Indian treaties, the discussion of these arguments
concentrates on the power of Congress to supersede treaties by subsequent statute. In any case, there
is only one case in which the Court held that a treaty provision repealed a prior statute. See L.
HENKIN, supra note 26, at 164, 411-12 n.113 (discussing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933)). The Attorney General has taken the position that an Indian treaty supersedes a prior statute.
13 Op. Att'y Gen. 354 (1870). The fact that only one case has held a statute to be superseded by a
treaty has been used to support the notion that statutes are superior to treaties. See Note, Congres-
sional Power to Abrogate the Domestic Effect of a United Nations Treaty Commitment: Diggs v.
Schultz (D.C. Cir. 1972), 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 158 (1974). The question here, how-
ever, is whether the established practice is fully justified.
62. See generally L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SmIrr, supra note 27, at 140-56; 1
L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 37-39; J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCrTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
76-100 (7th ed. 1972); Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi-
nese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853, 864-66 (1987).
63. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. Smrr, supra note 27, at 140-41.
64. See id. This idea underlies the statements in Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), aff'd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862), that the preliminary inquiry in
treaty-statute conflicts is to consider "the nature and objects of each species of law," and that the issue
involved in such conflicts is "solely a question of [domestic], as distinguished from [international]
law."
65. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. Szrr, supra note 27, at 140.
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approach," but self-executing treaties are incorporated automatically. 7
The last-in-time rule is clearly suspect under the second approach. The
first approach does not answer the question of the extent to which treaty
obligations may bind a domestic government,"' and it does not specify the
process required for domestic repeal.
A second type of argument starts with the premise that certain powers
belong to a sovereign qua sovereign and may not be abandoned or surren-
dered. Therefore, to the extent that the Constitution commits these powers
to Congress, legislation implementing these powers will be given effect,
any treaty to the contrary notwithstanding. The last-in-time rule merely
recognizes this principle."9 But treaties are by definition contracts in
which nations agree to restrict their sovereignty,70 and the mere fact that
nations regularly enter into treaties undercuts the premise of the argu-
ment. Moreover, the argument implies that there are no international ob-
ligations under certain types of treaties, a position specifically rejected by
pacta sunt servanda.71 The argument at best supports a right of abroga-
tion, but it does not address the question of what process is required for
domestic repeal. 2
By its very nature, a treaty must concern all parties to the agreement.
73
Thus, if state A writes a purely domestic law into an agreement in order
to circumvent its own domestic government, and state B cooperates by
merely signing the agreement, then the agreement would not constitute a
treaty under international law.74 To this extent, it might be argued, do-
mestic application of treaties is suspect and the last-in-time rule provides
a "checking" function. However, there is no a priori reason why domestic
matters are not of mutual concern. In addition, the argument loses much
of its force when applied to the United States, where the Senate or the full
Congress must give its consent. 5
The relevant constitutional arguments about the last-in-time rule center
on the text, history, and structure of the Constitution. Except for the order
in which they are presented, the text of the supremacy clause does not
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, pt. I, ch. 2, introductory note; Henkin, supra
note 62, at 865-66.
67. See cases cited supra note 29.
68. See Henkin, supra note 62, at 864-71.
69. See Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890). The Court has often relied on
this argument in applying the last-in-time rule to immigration cases. See Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 711 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892);
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). For a criticism of the argument in the
context of immigration treaties, see Henkin, supra note 62.
70. See L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 150-51, 411 n.111.
71. See sources cited supra note 23.
72. See L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 411 n.l11.
73. See id. at 142-43.
74. See id.
75. It was precisely such concerns that led to the Senate's role in the treaty-making process. See
D. ADLER, supra note 26, at 85-88; THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (A. Hamilton).
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distinguish between treaties and statutes as the supreme law of the land. 6
It has been suggested that this implies that treaties and statutes are
equivalent and that therefore the later in time should apply.77 However,
the supremacy clause also does not distinguish between treaties and stat-
utes on the one hand and the Constitution on the other, and it is clear that
the last-in-time rule does not apply to statutes or treaties vis-a-vis the
Constitution. 8
Neither the framers nor the ratifying conventions seem to have given
much thought to the potential conflict between treaties and statutes.79 The
historical materials suggest that Jay and Hamilton believed that treaties
were supreme with respect to both prior and subsequent statutes, 0 and
that Madison thought the opposite.8" The first extended discussion of the
issue occurred in 1796 during the House debates on the Jay treaty, and
there was no consensus.8 2
Structural arguments about the last-in-time rule focus on the separation
of powers. One argument assumes that a treaty cannot increase, decrease,
redistribute, or barter away the powers of any of the three branches of
government.83 Therefore, no treaty can restrict the power of future Con-
gresses to exercise their lawmaking functions.8 4 However, this argument
fails to distinguish between treaties granting powers that the Constitution
specifically does not grant8 5 from those that represent agreements not to
exercise powers already constitutionally granted." With respect to the lat-
ter, the Constitution specifically provides for treaties,87 which are by defi-
76. The argument has been made that because treaties are listed third, they are superseded by
both prior and subsequent statutes. See 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 450 (1796) (remarks of Rep.
Swanwick). Such an argument is contrary to the last-in-time rule. Moreover, one wonders how far the
argument should be carried. Consider, for example, that the judicial power is described in Article III
of the Constitution, and the legislative power and executive power in Articles I and II, respectively.
77. This argument underlies the Court's early statements that a self-executing treaty is "to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature," and that it would repeal "those
acts of congress which [are] repugnant to it." Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829).
78. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (treaties); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (statutes); L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 163; Henkin, supra note 62, at
871-72; see also E. BYRD, JR., TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
THEIR SEPARATE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS 23, 38-41 (1960) (arguing that framers assumed that
Constitution provides limits on treaty-making powers); L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 139 (executive
and legislative branches routinely recognize same limitation).
79. See L. ERADES & W. GOULD, supra note 35, at 373, 419-21.
80. See 1 C. BUTLER, supra note 3, § 313, at 449 (discussing views of Hamilton); L. ERADES &
W. GOULD, supra note 35, at 379-80, 419, 421-23 (discussing views of Hamilton and Jay).
81. See L. ERADES & W. GOULD, supra note 35, at 377 (discussing views of Madison).
82. See E. BYRD, JR., supra note 78, at 50-52 (analyzing debates); L. ERADES & W. GOULD,
supra note 35, at 380-84, 424-26 (same).
83. See, e.g., R. GHOSH, TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS: THEIR MUTUAL IMPACT
150-63 (1961).
84. See id. at 152.
85. Such treaties are invalid. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
86. Hamilton recognized this distinction. See A. HAMILTON, Camillus No. 36, in 6 THE WORKS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 165-71 (H. Cabot Lodge ed. 1904).
87. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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nition contracts in which nations agree to restrict their sovereignty."8 It
also provides that some congressional actions, such as the passage of a
statute raising the salaries of sitting Article III judges, do restrict the
power of future Congresses to exercise their lawmaking functions.8 9 This
structural argument at best is similar to the argument from sovereignty
discussed above, and similar responses can be given.90
A second separation of powers argument notes that both Congress and
the President have foreign affairs powers, an overlap that allows for flexi-
bility and checks and balances."1 The last-in-time rule recognizes this
overlap by enforcing the last will of the political sovereign.92 This is the
strongest constitutional argument for the last-in-time rule, and it has great
force in the case of a foreign affairs conflict between the executive and
legislative branches.
A final structural argument asserts that the last-in-time rule merely
says that treaty-statute conflicts are inherently political and should be left
to the political branches.93 However, there is some question about the na-
ture and scope of the political question doctrine,94 and in the case of trea-
ties this argument seems to be nothing more than a reformulation of the
previous separation of powers argument. 95
88. See L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 150-51, 411 n.111.
89. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 551 (1933).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
91. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 27-28, 32-35, 92; McDougal & Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Pol-
icy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 185-87, 202-10, 217-21, 238-55 (1945).
92. See L. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 33; McDougal & Lans, supra note 91, at 220-21 & n.31.
93. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("If the country with which the
treaty is made is dissatisfied with the action of the legislative department, it may present its complaint
to the executive head of the government, and take such other measures as it may deem essential for the
protection of its interests. The courts can afford no redress. Whether the complaining nation has just
cause of complaint, or our country was justified in its legislation, are not matters for judicial
cognizance.").
94. See, e.g., Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). For a
criticism of the doctrine as applied in treaty cases, see Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Ques-
tion": A Response, 101 HARV. L. REV. 524, 529-30 (1987) [hereinafter Henkin, Response].
95. Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1959) ("[A1I1 the [political question] doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are called upon
to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency of government the. . . determina-
tion of the issue raised .. ").
Professor Westen introduces an interesting twist to this argument by suggesting a different interpre-
tation of the last-in-time rule. See Westen, The Place of Foreign Treaties in the Courts of the United
States: A Reply to Louis Henkin, 101 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1987). Under his interpretation, treaties
are superior to statutes, id. at 512, and a person with a claim based on the breach of international
commitments is entitled to relief, id. at 516. But the Constitution requires courts to follow subsequent
statutes, id. at 512, and relief must be sought from the political branches, id. at 512, 516, 520-21. As
support for this position, Westen relies on the Court's statements in Indian and international treaty
cases that such claims are non-justiciable, id. at 516-17, and on an assertion that in 1789 nations did
not open their own courts to suits against themselves for the violation of treaties, id. at 521.
In response, several observations can be made. The Constitution specifically extends federal ques-
tion jurisdiction to cases arising under treaties. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Later decisions have
substantially modified the notion that Indian treaty claims are non-justiciable. See supra note 40;
infra notes 121-32 and accompanying text. With respect to Westen's historical assertions, it should be
noted that prize courts did provide a domestic forum for certain types of international law claims
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Other arguments for the last-in-time rule stem from prudential con-
cerns about treaties. First, the Court has indicated in at least one case that
allowing a statute to supersede a prior treaty is more democratic because
it recognizes the input of the House. 6 However, this argument is nothing
more than a complaint that the House was left out of the treaty-making
process. 97 The argument addresses neither agreements consented to by
both houses of Congress nor superseding statutes passed over a veto.
Moreover, it calls into question whether a treaty consented to only by the
Senate can supersede a prior statute.98 Second, several opinions have ar-
gued that the last-in-time rule avoids the absurdity of having domestic law
at the mercy of a foreign government.99 However, this argument justifies
at most a right of abrogation, and it does not specify the process required
for domestic repeal. Third, it might be suggested that the rule allows Con-
gress to abrogate the harmful effects of a treaty while preserving the
"clean hands" of the President. But the President's feelings generally are
well-known, and the argument makes little sense if the President signs the
superseding statute.1"'
Perhaps the best explanation of the last-in-time rule comes from the
concerns underlying its development in the nineteenth century. The rule
emerged in a time when the Court was very reluctant to strike down fed-
eral statutes.1 "' In addition, many of the early cases in which it was ap-
against the sovereign. See R. PARES, COLONIAL BLOCKADE AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS 1739-1763
(1938); see also Henkin, Response, supra note 94, at 530-31 (describing other practices). Finally,
interpreting Article III by considering eighteenth century foreign courts is problematic. Such an ap-
proach casts considerable doubt on the doctrine of judicial review. For other criticisms of Westen's
view, see Henkin, Response, supra note 94.
Even accepting Westen's basic position, it is plausible that the framers created the foreign affairs
overlap in part to provide the checks and balances necessary to protect the integrity of this dispute
resolution process. Thus, the overlap in foreign affairs is part of the core support of either interpreta-
tion of the last-in-time rule.
96. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
97. For a discussion of the reasons that the House was left out of the treaty-making process, see
D. ADLER, supra note 26, at 85-88, 98-101. The fact that the House was left out of the process has
been used to argue that Congress should not be able to vary a treaty's effect by subsequent statute. See
Note, supra note 61, at 159.
98. See Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 425 n.213.
99. In Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), affd, 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 481 (1862), Justice Curtis, sitting as Circuit Justice, argued, "That the constitution was
designed to place our country in this helpless condition, is a supposition wholly inadmissible." See
also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889) (arguing that rule could not be otherwise
without "deeply affecting [the nation's] independence"); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 629-30 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting) (repeating argument given in Taylor).
100. The President may be able to claim that she is forced to sign a particular statute because it
contains other provisions.
101. At the time that the Court announced the last-in-time rule in The Cherokee Tobacco, it had
struck down only three federal laws in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870) (striking
down Legal Tender Act), overruled, The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871); Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (striking down part of Missouri Compromise); and
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (striking down part of Judiciary Act of 1789).
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plied involved commercial treaties, I °2 a subject of particular concern to the
framers because of the importance of commercial affairs. I03
C. Critique of the Last-in-Time Rule Justification
The view that congressional abrogation of Indian treaties is an applica-
tion of the last-in-time rule is problematic for several reasons. First, the
rule generally leaves the non-domestic obligations of treaties intact,1 04 but
there is no suggestion in any decision that federal obligations contained in
Indian treaties survive abrogation in any way. In other words, a direct
analogy to the rule might suggest that statutes abrogate off-reservation
rights but not on-reservation rights.10 5
Second, the rule is particularly suspect when applied to Indian treaties.
The strongest arguments favoring the rule involve the separation of pow-
ers and prudential concerns about treaties.1'0 However, the separation of
powers argument does not apply because the doctrine of plenary congres-
sional power precludes the type of overlap that exists in foreign affairs.107
Prudential arguments are also unavailing. There is little worry about our
domestic law being held hostage: Indians have been willing to negotiate
when treaties have become outdated.' 1 The clean hands of the President
are not an issue in Indian affairs. Moreover, the critical provisions of In-
dian treaties, such as recognition and guarantees of sovereignty and terri-
102. See L. ERADES & W. GOULD, supra note 35, at 419-56; Comments by L. Sohn, 1969 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 180. The Cherokee Tobacco itself involved the commercial aspects of an Indian
treaty. In addition, two of the three cases cited therein for support also involved the commerce power,
and these were the cases cited for the proposition that a statute may supersede a prior treaty. See
supra note 57.
103. See E. BYRD, JR., supra note 78, at 31-33; L. ERADFS & W. GOULD, supra note 35, at
375-77. Commercial matters remain an area of special interest in international law; note the implied
right of withdrawal from commercial treaties. See Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 56; Inter-
national Law Commission Report, supra note 24, at 250-51.
104. See supra text accompanying note 36.
105. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 5, at 92. In the Pacific Northwest, several
treaties guarantee hunting rights both on-reservation and off-reservation. See generally D. GETCHES
& C. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 730-33.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83-103.
107. The Court views executive power over Indian affairs as following either explicitly or implic-
itly from congressional authorization. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963) (cit-
ing implied congressional consent as basis for President's power to reserve water rights by executive
order); Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1942) (citing implied congres-
sional consent as basis for President's power to create reservations by executive order). This view is
underscored by the Court's recent tendency to ground federal power over Indian affairs in specific
clauses of the Constitution, see infra text accompanying notes 125-28, because the President, unlike
Congress, has no specific grant of authority over Indian affairs, cf. C. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at
179 n.66 (arguing that President's war powers have been of limited importance since mid-nineteenth
century). Felix Cohen apparently viewed the President's power over Indian affairs as administrative
power delegated by Congress. See F: COHEN, supra note 5, at 100-15.
Moreover, the Court, in expressing the view that treaty-statute conflicts were inherently political,
relied in part on the fact that foreign states have international means of protecting their interests. See
supra note 93. Indians, however, lack this ability.
108. See, e.g., Seneca Nation of Indians v. United States, 338 F.2d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1964) (Moore,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 952 (1965); D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at
74, 92, 547.
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tory, do not bear any resemblance to the commercial matters involved in
the development of the rule. Thus, the last-in-time rule does not justify
congressional abrogation.
D. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The Plenary Power Doctrine and Rebus
Sic Stantibus
Even after The Cherokee Tobacco, Congress seemed unsure of the scope
of its authority to abrogate Indian treaties.10 9 In Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock,"' however, the Court clearly stated that Congress has broad power
to abrogate Indian treaties.11 Lone Wolf involved a treaty setting aside a
reservation and providing that no further land cessions would be valid
without the approval of at least three-fourths of all adult males occupying
the reservation. 2 A later "agreement" provided for further cessions,11
and subsequent legislation opened up a large part of the reservation for
homesteading." 4 The Indians argued that treaty-guaranteed property
rights could not be unilaterally abrogated by Congress without violating
due process, 1 5 and that the subsequent legislation amounted to unilateral
abrogation because the "agreement" was obtained by fraud and lacked the
three-fourths consent required by the treaty." 6 In a somewhat disorga-
nized opinion, the Court rejected the due process argument and thereby
avoided the question of whether the "agreement" was valid.
117
The Court began by implying that abrogation may be viewed as an
exercise of Congress' plenary power:
Congress [possesses] a paramount power over the property of the In-
dians, by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests,
and . . . such authority might be implied, even though opposed to
the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians. . . . Plenary authority
over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Con-
gress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a
political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department
of the government."'
109. This hesitancy may be explained by the fact that most treaties abrogated earlier involved
commerce and immigration. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. The government often strug-
gled to maintain the appearance that changes in treaties were due to "agreement" rather than unilat-
eral congressional action. A good example is the attempt to obtain the Black Hills by "agreement."
See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374-84 (1980).
110. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
111. Congress apparently viewed this decision as an enlargement of its powers. See Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587-88, 594-95 & n.17, 598 & n.19 (1977).
112. Treaty of Oct. 21, 1867, arts. II, XII, 15 Stat. 581, 582, 585.
113. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, § 6, 31 Stat. 672, 676.
114. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 846, 31 Stat. 1093; Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 832, 31 Stat. 1058,
1078-79; Act of Jan. 4, 1901, ch. 8, 31 Stat. 727.
115. 187 U.S. at 564.
116. Id. at 554-64.
117. Id. at 567-68.
118. Id. at 565.
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After relying on the last-in-time rule,' 9 the Court offered yet a third
justification, one closely resembling rebus sic stantibus, the doctrine of
changed circumstances:
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty,
though presumably such power will be exercised only when circum-
stances arise which not only justify the government in disregarding
the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the
country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so. When,
therefore, treaties were entered into between the United States and a
tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate ex-
isted in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be
availed of from considerations of governmental policy, particularly if
consistent with good faith towards the Indians. 2 '
Note that the Court suggests that the doctrine may be invoked because
of the interests of the nation as a whole or the obligations of the United
States as guardian.
E. Critique of the Plenary Power Justification
The view that congressional abrogation is an application of the plenary
power doctrine is unpersuasive today because the doctrine has been signif-
icantly narrowed since Lone Wolf The term "plenary power" has at least
three meanings: exclusive power, preemptive power, and power that is
unlimited both in the manner in which it may be used and as to the objec-
tives that may be pursued.12' In Indian law, the term has been used with
each meaning.' 22
The third meaning, however, has been considerably narrowed. 23 The
Lone Wolf Court spoke of plenary power over Indian affairs as unreview-
able.' 2 ' In recent cases, however, the Court has exercised judicial re-
view' 25 and has specifically repudiated the notion that congressional ac-
119. Id. at 566.
120. Id. (emphasis in original).
121. See Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 283,
362-66 (1976).
122. See Newton, supra note 5, at 196 n.3; Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs
After Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 240-50 (1982); supra note 107.
123. See C. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 79-80; Newton, supra note 5, at 228-36; Comment,
supra note 122.
124. See supra text accompanying note 118. See generally Newton, supra note 5, at 207-28;
Comment, supra note 122, at 238-50.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 409-23 (1980) (abrogation
of treaty-protected property rights will be subjected to Fifth Amendment taking analysis when abroga-
tion is not good faith exercise of guardian power); Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73, 85 (1977) (applying rational basis test in equal protection challenge to statute unfavorable to
Indians); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (applying rational basis test in equal protec-
tion challenge to statute favorable to Indians); see also Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States,
299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937) (right to interest on Fifth Amendment taking comes from Fifth Amendment
itself and not from special jurisdictional statute); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913)
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tions in this area are unreviewable.' 26 The Court also has stated that
Congress' power over Indian affairs is "drawn both explicitly and implic-
itly from the Constitution itself.1127 Accordingly, modern decisions seek to
ground congressional power in specific clauses of the Constitution. 28 The
Court's latest statement on abrogation, while quoting Lone Wolf, does not
rely on the plenary power language, 29 and the Court arguably has sepa-
rated plenary power from the power to abrogate Indian treaties.'3 0 The
plenary power argument most closely resembles several of the arguments
offered in favor of the last-in-time rule, particularly the separation of
powers arguments, the argument from sovereignty, and the argument
based on the nature of treaties. As such, it can be met with the same
responses. 13 ' Thus, the plenary power doctrine does not justify congres-
sional abrogation.'32
F. Critique of the Rebus Sic Stantibus Justification
The view that congressional abrogation is an application of rebus sic
stantibus is problematic for several reasons. First, it is difficult to view
congressional abrogation as treaty termination. There is great controversy
about the power of Congress to terminate treaties .133 In any case, Con-
gress has used explicit language when it has attempted to terminate inter-
national treaties,' but only one Indian treaty was so abrogated.' 35
Treaty termination by one party may free the other party as well, 8' but
there is no suggestion in the decisions that the Indians are now free to
disregard their treaty obligations. Unilateral treaty termination requires
(Congress may not bring community under plenary power by arbitrarily calling it Indian tribe);
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912) (statute making Indian land non-taxable created property right
protected by Fifth Amendment); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899) (title to land granted to Indian
by treaty cannot be divested by subsequent legislation).
126. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980); Delaware Tribal
Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).
127. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974).
128. See Newton, supra note 5, at 230-31. For a general discussion of constitutional sources of
power, see F. COHEN, supra note 5, at 89-102.
129. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
130. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 410-15 (1980).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75, 83-95.
132. Given that the Court relies on two other arguments in Lone Wolf, it may be that plenary
power merely provides the jurisdictional basis for the statute at issue. Another possibility is that the
Court is referring to the fact that the United States holds the ultimate fee in Indian lands, subject to
an Indian right of use and occupancy. See Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 571-92 (1823). The trouble with the latter explanation is that the issue in Lone Wolf
did not involve the ultimate fee, but rather the right of use and occupancy.
133. See supra text accompanying note 26.
134. See Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 34, 41 Stat. 988, 1007; Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 153, §
16, 38 Stat. 1164, 1184; Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 4, 36 Stat. 11, 83; Joint Resolution of Jan. 18,
1865, 13 Stat. 566; Joint Resolution of Apr. 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109; Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat.
578.
135. V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 1, at 43 (citing Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, § 1,
12 Stat. 652, 652).
136. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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formal notice,1 3 7 but there is no record of this having been done in the
case of Indian treaties."' It is plausible that the reason favoring formal
notice by the head of state-namely, that states interact through heads of
state-requires only that Indians be given notice by Congress, which is
deemed by the plenary power doctrine13 to be the head of state in Indian
affairs. However, this would imply an express statement principle, which
the Court has thus far refused to impose.14 0
Second, the conditions for invoking rebus sic stantibus are rarely satis-
fied in the Indian context.1 " The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus4 2 holds
that a treaty may be terminated due to a fundamental change in circum-
stances that has occurred since the making of the agreement.1 4 3 The
change must have been unforeseen, 1 " but it could be argued that the
United States was aware of the changed circumstances under which many
Indian treaties might be claimed to be terminated.1 4 The terminated
treaty obligations must be unperformed; 4" for example, the doctrine
would not cover treaties setting a boundary.147 Thus, the boundary setting
provisions of Indian treaties arguably are outside the scope of the doc-
trine, 14 as are provisions recognizing sovereignty or guaranteeing mineral
rights. In addition, the effect of the change must be to transform radically
137. See sources cited supra note 25. Congressional terminations often direct the President to give
formal notice. See, e.g., Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 34, 41 Stat. 988, 1007; Act of Mar. 4, 1915,
ch. 153, § 16, 38 Stat. 1164, 1184; Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 4, 36 Stat. 11, 83; Joint Resolution of
Jan. 18, 1865, 13 Stat. 566; Joint Resolution of Apr. 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109.
138. The one termination of an Indian treaty did not direct the President to give formal notice.
See Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 652, 652.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 121-28.
140. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986) (express statement is preferable but
not required for abrogation). For other doctrinal justifications of an express statement principle, see
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1.
141. See Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 41, at 699-700; Higgins, International Law Consid-
eration of the American Indian Nations by the United States, 3 ARiz. L. REv. 74, 84 (1961).
142. For more detailed discussions of this doctrine, see International Law Commission Report,
supra note 24, at 256-68; Haraszti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146
RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1975); Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, and Comments, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 653, 1096-1126 (1935).
The usual argument advanced in favor of the doctrine is that if international law provided no way
to terminate an unduly burdensome treaty, it is likely that parties would take action outside of the
law. See International Law Commission Report, supra note 24, at 256-58. For other justifications,
see Haraszti, supra, at 46-60.
143. The circumstances must have been an essential basis of the consent to be bound by the treaty.
See Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 46, at 156-58 (judgment of June 7); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 336; Vi-
enna Convention, supra note 25, art. 62.
144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 336; Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art.
62; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 939.
145. See, e.g., W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 170 (1975) (noting debate on whether
westward expansion was foreseen, but suggesting that expansion was always considered possible).
146. See RFSTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 336; Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art.
62; Haraszti, supra note 142, at 68.
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 336 comment b; Vienna Convention, supra
note 25, art. 62; International Law Commission Report, supra note 24, at 259; Haraszti, supra note
142, at 41, 43, 65-69.
148. See Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 41, at 699.
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the extent of these obligations,14 9 and an argument of economic necessity
based on the need for more land15 is not likely to satisfy the require-
ment.151 The doctrine includes a "clean hands" principle, under which the
party invoking the doctrine must not have wrongfully caused the change
in circumstances, 52 but it could be argued forcefully that in the Indian
context the United States was the cause of many, if not most, substantial
changes.15 3 Rebus sic stantibus requires that the party intending to invoke
the doctrine has approached the other parties in a good faith effort to
settle the problem,' 5 but many negotiations with the Indians were char-
acterized by coercion, threats, and bribery on the part of the United
States.15 5 Finally, international courts have generally avoided giving effect
to the doctrine, usually on the ground that it was not applicable to the
facts at hand, and the number of cases calling for application of the rule is
small. 5' Thus, rebus sic stantibus does not justify congressional
abrogation.
III. CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF INDIAN TREATIES: REFORM
Congressional abrogation of Indian treaties should be viewed as super-
session by a subsequent statute, but the power should be limited by a
"last-in-time plus" rule-the last-in-time rule supplemented by an ex-
press statement rule and a requirement of a justification acceptable for
terminating treaties under international law. 57 This scheme represents a
reasonable synthesis that takes into account the previous discussion. 158 In-
149. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 336; Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art.
62.
150. There is little doubt that many treaties were abrogated because of the desire for more land.
See, e.g., Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 611 n.47.
151. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 21, 61 (judgment of Feb. 2) (rejecting
claim that threat to national economy constituted radical transformation).
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 336 comment b; International Law Commis-
sion Report, supra note 24, at 260.
153. See Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 41, at 699-700; Higgins, supra note 141, at 83-84;
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 336 reporters' note 4 (aggressor cannot use result-
ing hostilities as rebus sic stantibus justification); W. WASHBURN, supra note 145, at 204-05 (dis-
cussing responsibility of United States in provoking wars with Plains Indians).
154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 336 comment f; Vienna Convention, supra
note 25, arts. 65, 66; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 941-42; Haraszti, supra note 142, at 83-85.
155. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374-84 (1980); Choctaw Nation
v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970); W. WASHBURN, supra note 145, at 101-02; Wilkinson
& Volkman, supra note 1, at 609-11.
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 153 comment a (1965); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 940.
157. For a list of these justifications, see supra text accompanying note 24. If the Court modifies
the plenary power doctrine to recognize a significant independent role for the President, then separa-
tion of powers concerns may support application of the traditional last-in-time rule. For a discussion
of possible sources of presidential power, see V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 1, at 34-40.
The traditional last-in-time rule, however, should be limited to the abrogation of off-reservation
rights. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
158. A functionally similar but doctrinally distinct position is to conclude from Sections I and II
that congressional power to abrogate Indian treaties should be limited to treaty termination. The
problem with this position is that it leaves international treaties subject to the last-in-time rule, and it
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deed, the Court's admission that the last-in-time rule is not derived from
the Constitution 159 can be seen as a recognition that the exact nature of
the rule is subject to the doctrinal considerations examined above. More-
over, the increased protection is consistent with the Court's increased pro-
tection of Indian treaties in other areas.160
Presumably, most abrogations would occur under rebus sic stantibus,
based on changed circumstances that affect the interests of the nation as a
whole or the obligations of the United States as guardian.161 Other abro-
gations might occur, for example, by consent of the parties.16 2 Whether
the necessary conditions are satisfied would be a question for the courts.'
6 3
This scheme would result in a heavier emphasis on negotiation, both
because Congress would have a burden of justification and because it may
be politically difficult to pass statutes with express statements of abroga-
tion. But Indians have been willing to discuss treaty disputes, 6 and In-
dian leaders have put forward concrete proposals for reinstituting the ne-
gotiation process.1
65
The proposed limits would affect the plenary power doctrine in several
ways. They would diminish congressional power over Indian rights. On
the other hand, they do recognize extensive congressional power over In-
dian treaties, a power that is hotly contested with respect to international
treaties.16 Furthermore, the proposal allows the guardian responsibility
is doubtful that the framers of the Constitution, whatever their feelings about the rule, would have felt
that international treaties could be superseded by statute but that Indian treaties could not be. One
could respond that the "last-in-time plus" rule should apply to both, that the last-in-time rule should
not apply to international treaties, or that the thoughts of the framers are not relevant. However, the
first response needs more justification, and the last two responses sharply pose the difficult doctrinal
question of whether a treaty can trump the Constitution, assuming that a treaty can trump both prior
and subsequent statutes.
159. See supra text accompanying note 55.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
161. Rebus sic stantibus would be relevant, for example, when a federal wildlife conservation
statute conflicts with treaty hunting rights. See generally Coggins & Modrcin, Native American Indi-
ans and Federal Wildlife Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 375 (1979); Pitt, Eagles and Indians: The Law
and the Survival of a Species, 5 PUB. LAND L. REV. 100 (1984); Walker, On-Reservation Treaty
Hunting Rights: Abrogation v. Regulation by Federal Conservation Statutes-What Standard?, 26
NAT. RESOURCES J. 187 (1986).
162. Many Indian treaties contain clauses holding previous treaties to be superseded. See, e.g.,
Treaty of Apr. 29, 1868, art. XVII, 15 Stat. 635, 640.
163. The courts already determine whether action is a legitimate exercise of the guardian author-
ity in deciding whether a Fifth Amendment taking has occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 409-23 (1980). It is plausible that the courts, in deciding whether
proffered rebus sic stantibus justifications are legitimate, should give some deference to a congres-
sional finding. The courts could apply a rational basis test, which would be consistent with scrutiny in
other areas of Indian affairs. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974); C. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 82. However, the
inquiries might require different standards. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 413 n.28.
164. See sources cited supra note 108.
165. See V. DELORIA, JR., supra note 7, at 48-53, 249-63.
166. See sources cited supra note 26.
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to be used as an independent basis for abrogation under rebus sic
stantibus.1
0 7
In addition to the doctrinal arguments examined above, the increased
protection of Indian treaties is reasonable given the complex status and
history of the Indians. Early international law considered indigenous peo-
ples to be sovereign nations capable of treaty relations,168 and today there
is a growing rerecognition of the fundamental rights of native popula-
tions.16 9 Even the young United States treated the Indians as equal pow-
ers.17 1 Until the early nineteenth century, Indians negotiated from a posi-
tion of strength because of their physical power and the fact that they
could ally themselves with the European powers.17 1 With the removal of
the Europeans, Indians found themselves at a disadvantage in the negotia-
tion process, 1 2 and increasingly treaties were imposed upon them.
7 3
There is something particularly unseemly about the United States unilat-
erally abrogating treaties, many of which it imposed, with a people whose




Justice Black wrote: "Great nations, like great men, should keep their
word." 175 This Note proposes no more than that the United States be
required to "keep its word" as that phrase is properly understood in the
Indian context.
167. In addition, some deference might be given to congressional findings. See supra note 163.
168. See Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 41, at 680-81; Williams, The Medieval and Renais-
sance Origins of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983);
Note, supra note 3, at 254-55.
169. See Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indige-
nous Populations: Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/AC.4/1987/WP.1/Add.1 (1987) (collecting provisions of international agreements concerning
rights of indigenous populations). If recognition of these rights constitutes an international norm,
congressional power over Indian affairs may be limited by international law. See Paust, Rediscovering
the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in
Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393, 418-43 (1988).
170. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 548-49 (1832); Note, supra note 3, at 255
& n.141.
171. See W. WASHBURN, supra note 145, at 126-69; Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at
608-09.
172. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 609-11 & n.42 (discussing language barrier and
increasing use of threats, coercion, bribery, and fraud).
173. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970); W. WASHBURN, supra
note 145, at 101-02; Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 609-11.
174. Cf Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62
YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953) ("[Tlhe Indian plays much the same role in our American society that the
Jews played in Germany."). The original Indian population was devastated by disease and a system-
atic policy of-cultural extermination. See, e.g., W. WASHBURN, supra note 145, at 104-07, 233-49.
For a brief history of federal Indian policy, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
47-206 (3d ed. 1982).
175. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
